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290 RoDABAUGH v. TEKUS [39 C.2d 
[L.A. No. 22246. In Bank. July 14, 1952.] 
DESSIE S. RODABAUGH et al., Appellants, v. PAUL 
TEKUS, Respondent. 
[1] Negligence-Evidence-Last Clear Chance.-Mere fact that 
evidence in a given case may be sufficient to sustain a finding 
of negligence on the part of a defendant does not justify the 
conclusion that such evidence is sufficient to permit application 
of the last clear chance doctrine; there must, in addition, be 
substantial evidence to show that defendant had a last clear 
chance to avoid the accident. 
[2a-2c] Automobiles-Evidence-Last Clear Chance.-In action 
for wrongful death arising out of a collision of automobiles 
at an intersection, evidence that both cars were approaching 
the intersection at approximately the same time and at 
approximately the same speed, that decedent did not reach 
a point of danger from which he could not extricate himself 
until he was within 60 feet of the path of defendant's car, 
that defendant could assume that decedent would obey a stop 
sign until decedent had arrived at a point within such dis-
tance of 60 feet, and that decedent was admittedly negligent 
in not obeying the stop sign and in proceeding directly across 
defendant's path without diminishing his speed of 35 to 40 
miles per hour, is insufficient to warrant application of the 
last clear chance doctrine in favor of plaintiffs. 
[3] !d.-Last Clear Chance-Ability to Escape.-Motorist ap-
proaching an intersection is not in a position of danger, 
within meaning of last clear chance doctrine, until he arrives 
at a point at which he can no longer stop or slow down in 
time to avoid a collision. 
[4] !d.-Assumption by Motorist as to Conduct of Others.-.A 
motorist on a through highway had the right to assume that 
another motorist approaching an intersection from a side 
road possessed normal faculties, and that he saw stop warn-
ings which were directly within the range of his vision. 
[5] !d.-Last Clear Chance-Collision of Moving Vehicles.-Doc-
trine of last clear chance should not be applied in a case 
involving a collision of moving vehicles where the act creating 
the peril occurs practically simultaneously with the happen-
ing of the accident and where neither party can fairly be 
said to have had a last clear chance thereafter to avoid the 
consequences. 
[1] See Car.Jur., Negligence,§ 80; Am.Jur., Negligence,§ 215. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 148; [2] Automobiles, 
§ 271; [3, 5] Automobiles,§ 152; [4] Automobiles, § 80; [6] Neg-
ligence, § 48. 
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[6] Negligence-Last Clear Chance.-To relieve a plaintiff of his 
own negligence it is not enough that defendant may have had 
a chance to avoid the accident, but defendant must have had 
the last chance and also had a clear chance to do so by the 
exercise of ordinary care; this implies that his chance to 
avoid the accident must have come later in point of time than 
any similar chance on the part of the injured person, and that 
he must have had more than a bare possible chance to avoid 
an unexpected peril created practically simultaneously with 
the happening of the accident by the negligence of the injured 
party. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. Raymond Thompson, Judge . .Affirmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death as result of an 
automobile collision. Judgment for defendant notwithstanding 
verdict for plaintiffs, affirmed. 
Elmer R. Guy, Hirson & Horn and 'rheodore .A. Horn for 
Appellants. 
Robert .A. Cushman for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs, the widow and adult sons of 
.Andrew C. Rodabaugh, brought this action to recover dam-
ages for the latter's death as a result of an automobile col-
lision. Following the denial of defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor 
for $2,500. Defendant then moved for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. The trial court granted this motion, 
and judgment was entered in defendant's favor. On this 
appeal, plaintiffs challenge the correctness of this ruling. 
Plaintiffs conceded in the trial court and now concede 
that the deceased was guilty of negligence in the operation 
of his own automobile, and that his negligence contributed 
to his death. However, the trial court instructed the jury 
on the doctrine of last clear chance. Defendant maintains 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain plaintiffs' re-
covery on that theory, and that the trial court properly 
so determined in granting his motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to plaintiffs, with every legitimate inference 
drawn in their favor (Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647, 
649-650 [122 P.2d 576] ; Champion v. Bennetts, 37 Cal.2d 
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815, 820 [236 P.2d 155] ; Shannon v. Thomas, 57 Cal.App.2d 
187, 192-193 [134 P.2d 522] ), defendant's position must 
nevertheless be sustained. · 
There is no material conflict in the evidence. The only 
eyewitnesses were defendant and his passenger. Plaintiffs 
called defendant under section 2055 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, and they base their claims upon the testimony 
elicited from him. Defendant called his passenger a:s a de-
fense witness, and his testimony substantially corroborated 
that of defendant. 
The accident occurred in Orange County about 7 :20 a. m. 
on August 24, 1948, at the intersection of Bolsa Street, 
an east and west state highway, and Golden West Avenue, 
a county road running north and south. Both roadways 
are approximately 20 feet wide and are paved, but with soft, 
sandy shoulders on both sides of the pavement. There are 
ditches on either side of Golden West A venue. The view 
of the intersection is unobstructed from all sides, and at 
the time of the accident, there was a slight fog with visibility 
about 500 feet. Bolsa Street, on which defendant was travel-
ing, is a through highway, and at the north and south ap-
proaches to it from Golden West A venue there are regula-
tion stop signs. (V eh. Code, § 4 71.) In addition, the word 
"stop" and a white stop line are painted across the north-
bound traffic lane of Golden West A venue a few feet south 
of Bolsa Street. There also is a wavering white line cross-
ing and recrossing the white center line of Golden West 
A venue for approximately 300 feet south of the intersection. 
Decedent was driving north on Golden West A venue at 
35 to 40 miles per hour, and defendant was driving west 
on Bolsa Street at approximately 40 miles per hour. When 
defendant first observed decedent, each of the automobiles 
was approximately 500 feet from the intersection. Decedent 
subsequently failed to heed the stop warnings, and continued 
into the intersection to the point of impact without slacken-
ing his speed. 
Defendant testified that he continued to watch decedent's 
car; that when defendant was some 75 to 100 feet from 
the intersection and saw that decedent was not slowing 
down, he started to apply his brakes gently, thinking that 
decedent would probably stop ; that as decedent approached, 
he appeared to be looking straight ahead and did not slacken 
his speed at any time before the impact occurred; that when 
decedent did not slow down, defendant applied his brakes 
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harder at about 75 feet from the intersection, and at a 
distance of 35 feet he slammed them on, leaving skid marks 
on the pavement. Defendant further testified that travel-
ing at 40 miles per hour, he could have stopped his car in 
approximately 60 feet. Defendant did not turn to the right 
or left before the impact, and his car struck decedent's car 
on the right side at the rear door and wheel. The collision 
occurred in the northeast quadrant of the intersection. When 
the vehicles came to rest, decedent's car was in a ditch near 
the northwest corner of the intersection, some 39 feet from 
the point of impact, and defendant's car was some 25 feet 
west of said point facing east. 
The parties are agreed on the necessary elements which 
must be present in order to warrant the application of the 
last clear chance doctrine. These elements were stated by 
this court in Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 202 
[13 P.2d 915], and were recently reiterated in Belinsky v. 
Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102, 104 [237 P.2d 645], and Peterson 
v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d 107, 109 [237 P.2d 977]. The 
real dispute between the parties here involves the question 
of whether there is any substantial evidence to meet all 
the essential requirements for the application of that doctrine. 
Plaintiffs contend that there is such evidence in the record 
before us. Defendant concedes that the evidence is sufficient 
to establish that decedent through his own negligence placed 
himself in a position of danger, and that prior to the occur-
rence of the collision defendant had actual knowledge of 
that fact. Defendant contends, however, that there is no sub-
stantial evidence to show that after defendant acquired knowl-
edge of decedent's perilous situation, he had a clear chance 
to avoid the collision by the exercise of ordinary care or 
that he failed to exercise such care. 
[1] In discussing the contentions of the parties, it is 
important to bear in mind that the mere fact that the evi-
dence in a given case may be sufficient to sustain a finding 
of negligence on the part of a defendant does not justify 
the conclusion that such evidence is sufficient to permit the 
application of the last clear chance doctrine. Negligence 
is but one of the several elements involved in said doctrine, 
and reliance on the doctrine presupposes negligence on the 
part of both parties. In addition, however, there must be 
substantial evidence to show that defendant had a last 
clear chance to avoid the accident. (Dalley v. Williams, 73 
Cal.App.2d 427, 433 [166 P.2d 595] ; Berton v. Cochran, 81 
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Cal.App.2d 776, 779[185 P.2d 349]; De Vore v. Faris, 88 
Cal.App.2d 576, 583 [199 P.2d 391] .) 
[2a] We may assume without deciding that there is suf-
ficient evidence to sustain a finding of some negligence on 
the part of defendant, despite the fact that he was traveling 
on a through highway and was entitled to assume until the 
contrary was apparent, that decedent would obey the law 
and would not drive his car past the stop sign directly 
into the path of defendant's car. (V eh. Code, § § 552, 577; 
Dickinson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 55 Cal.App.2d 824, 
827 [ 131 P .2d 401].) However, the evidence is insufficient 
to support a finding that after defendant discovered de-
cedent's peril, he had a last clear chance to avoid the col-
lision. The fact that defendant saw that decedent was look-
ing straight ahead while decedent was traveling approxi-
mately 500 feet in approaching the intersection does not 
establish that decedent was in a position of danger this entire 
distance. [3] Decedent was not in a position of danger until 
he arrived at a point at which he could no longer stop 
or slow down in time to avoid a collision. (Dalley v. Wil-
liams, sup,ra, 73 Oal.App.2d 427,435; also, Yo~mg v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 369, 380-381 [190 P. 36].) [4] Defendant 
had the right to assume that decedent possessed normal 
faculties, and that he saw the stop warnings which were 
directly within the range of his vision. (Folger v. Rich-
field Oil Corp., 80 Cal.App.2d 655, 660-661[182 P.2d 337].) 
Plaintiffs set forth the respective speeds and distances 
found in the testimony, and then argue by a series of mathe-
matical calculations that such evidence is sufficient to support 
a finding that defendant had a last clear chance to avoid 
the accident. In our view this argument is without merit. 
Under any view of the testimony it is clear that both cars 
were approaching the intersection at approximately the same 
time and at approximately the same speed. Disregarding 
for the moment the fact that defendant was traveling on 
the through highway and decedent was traveling on a road 
which was plainly marked with stop warnings, it is ap-. 
parent that this case presents the picture of one of the 
usual types of intersection collisions between two rapidly 
moving vehicles. It has been frequently stated that the last 
clear chance doctrine is ordinarily inapplicable under such 
conditions. (Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 136 Cal.App. 
223, 232 [28 P.2d 932] ; also Johnson v. Sacramento Northern 
Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 532 [129 P.2d 503] ; Dalley v. Wil-
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liams, supra, 73 Cal.A.pp.2d 427, 436; Folger v. Richfield Oil 
Corp., supra, 80 Cal.A.pp.2d 655, 660; Berton v. Cochran, 
supra, 81 Cal.A.pp.2d 776, 781; Allin v. Snavely, 100 Cal. 
A.pp.2d 411, 415 [224 P.2d 113] .) 
[5] As was said in Poncino v. Reid-Mttrdock & Co., supra, 
at page 232: ''Like many other cases involving collisions 
between moving vehicles, the accident may be said to have 
happened within the twinkling of an eye after the first 
indication of danger. While the doctrine of last clear chance 
has been applied in certain exceptional cases involving col-
lisions between moving vehicles, we are of the opinion that 
it should not be applied to the ordinary case in which the 
act creating the peril occurs practically simultaneously with 
the happening of the accident and in which neither party 
can fairly be said to have had a last clear chance thereafter 
to avoid the consequences. To apply the doctrine to such 
cases would be equivalent to denying the existence of the 
general rule which makes contributory negligence a bar 
to recovery." 
[2b] Certain phases of plaintiffs' argument should be 
mentioned. Plaintiffs rely heavily upon defendant's testi-
mony to the effect that he could have stopped within a dis-
tance of 60 feet while traveling at 40 miles per hour. There 
is no other testimony in the record relating to the distance 
required to stop a car by the application of brakes. As 
plaintiffs accept this testimony, it appears therefrom that 
decedent did not reach a point of danger from which he 
could not extricate himself until he was within 60 feet of 
the path of defendant's car ; and that defendant could as-
sume that decedent would obey the stop sign until decedent 
had arrived at a point within such distance of 60 feet. A. 
vehicle traveling at a speed of 40 miles per hour travels 
approximately 60 feet per second, and plaintiffs do not dispute 
the fact that defendant's total time for reaction and effective 
action after discovering decedent's perilous situation was 
neces,;ari]y somewhere between 1 :1,4_ and 13,0 seconds. Plain-
tiffs' calculations do not sustain their position. A.s was said 
in St. Lonis S.W. R11. Co. v. Sirnpson, 286 U.S. 346, at page 
351 [52 S.Ct. 520, 76 L.Ed. 1152] : "Calculations so 11ice are 
unavailing to prove anything except the unity of the wJ10le 
transaction. The Reveral acts of negligence were too closely 
welded together in time as well as in quality to be viewed 
as independent." 
[6] In Ponm:no v. Reid-Murdock & Co., supra, 136 Cal. 
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App. 223, at page 227, it was further said: "In other words, 
it is not enough to relieve a plaintiff of his own negligence 
that the defendant may have had a chance to avoid the acci-
dent, but defendant must have had the last chance and also 
had a clear chance to do so by the exercise of ordinary care. 
That he should have had the last chance implies that his 
chance to avoid the accident must have come later in point of 
time than any similar chance on the part of the injured 
person. That he should have had a clear chance implies that 
he must have had more than a bare possible chance to avoid 
an unexpected peril created practically simultaneously with 
the happening of the accident by the negligence of the injured 
party." 
Plaintiffs also argue that defendant acted negligently in 
not turning to the right or left to avoid the collision. We 
have heretofore assumed, solely for the purpose of this dis-
cussion, that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding 
of some negligence on the part of defendant. As above indi-
cated, this does not suffice to bring into operation the last 
clear chance doctrine. [2c] In passing it may be stated, how-
ever, that defendant was admittedly traveling on a narrow 
through road 20 feet in width with soft shoulders on either 
side; that he was approaching a narrow, intersecting road 
with ditches on either side thereof; and that decedent was 
admittedly negligent in not obeying the stop sign and in 
proceeding directly across defendant's path without diminish-
ing his speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour. Plaintiffs fail to 
indicate in which direction they believe that defendant should 
have attempted to turn under these circumstances. As we 
view the evidence on which plaintiffs rely, it was sufficient 
to warrant the application of the imminent peril doctrine 
in favor of defendant (Peterson v. Devine, 68 Cal.App.2d 
387, 392-393 [156 P.2d 936] ; Wilkerson v. Brown, 84 Cal. 
App.2d 401, 408 [190 P.2d 958]), but was insufficient to 
warrant the application of the last clear chance doctrine in 
favor of plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs cite and rely upon certain decisions, in addition 
to those heretofore mentioned, in which the last clear chance 
doctrine has been applied. (Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35 
Cal.2d 16 [215 P.2d 728]; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 
Cal. 205 [13 P.2d 918] ; Bragg v. Smith, 87 Cal.App.2d 11 
[195 P.2d 546]; Root v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 84 Cal. 
App.2d 135 [190 P.2d 48] ; Gillette v. City of San Francisco, 
58 Cal.App.2d 434 [136 P.2d 611]; Yates v. Morotti, 120 
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Cal..App. 710 [8 P.2d 519] .) Many of these cases have pre-
sented close questions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence 
to warrant the application of the doctrine, but they are all 
distinguishable on their facts. In none of the cited authorities 
was a through highway involved nor was there such a rela-
tion between the time, distance and speed factors as is 
found in the present case. The language used in BagwiU v. 
Pacific Electric R. Co., 90 Cal.App. 114, at page 121 [265 
P. 517], is singularly applicable here:" Certainly the doctrine 
of last clear chance never meant a splitting of seconds when 
emergencies ·arise. . . . We are not to tear down the facts of 
a case and rebuild the same so that, by a trimming down 
and tight-fitting operation, something can be constructed upon 
which may be fastened the claim of last clear chance. The 
words mean exactly as they indicate, namely, last cle.ar chance, 
not possible chance.'' 
' We therefore conclude that the record is devoid of sub-
stantial evidence to sustain the application of the last clear 
chance doctrine, and that it was error for the trial court to 
instruct the jury with respect thereto. (Wallis v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 184 Cal. 662, 672 [195 P. 408, 15 A.L.R. 117); 
Palmer v. TschtLdy, 191 Cal. 696, 700-7.01 [218 P. 36].) The 
trial court therefore properly granted defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-In my view there appears 
no substantial and legally sound basis for distinguishing this 
case, in favor of a reversal here and an affirmance there, from 
Peterson v. Burkhalter (1951), 38 Cal.2d 107, 114 [237 P.2d 
977]. In the interests of clarity of principle I think that the 
last cited case should either be followed or expressly over-
ruled. Since I believe that the Peterson case is erroneous, as 
pointed out in my dissent (p. 114 of 38 Cal.2d), I would 
overrule it. With such further statement of grounds I concur 
in the opinion and judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion in this case is contrary to the authori-
ties, usurps the function of the jury and makes serious inroads 
into the last clear chance doctrine. 
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It is held that the doctrine is inapplicable because de-
fendant did not, as a matter of law, have a chance to avoid 
the accident by acting as a person of ordinance prudence. In 
addition to his ability to stop, which is demonstrated by the 
evidence, he could have swerved to the left and averted the 
collision. The evidence shows that both cars were traveling 
at about 40 miles per hour; that defendant saw the deceased 
500 feet from the intersection; that when the latter was 
30 feet from it defendant was 75 feet and decedent was 
looking straight ahead and did not slow down at all, obviously 
indicating to defendant that he would not stop at the stop 
sign. Yet defendant applied his brakes only lightly, not 
forcefully enough to stop his car and avoid a collision. The 
accident occurred in the northeast part of the intersection 
and decedent's car was struck at the left rear wheel and door. 
The highway was 20 feet wide. No other cars were on the 
highway. Defendant made no effort to swerve to the left 
to avert the collision which he plainly could have done. Thus, 
he had ample opportunity to avoid the collision either by 
stopping or swerving. It was for the jury to say whether as 
.a man of ordinary prudence he should have followed one course 
or the other. 
The majority opinion weighs the evidence and concludes 
that there was no last clear chance by such statements as, 
that defendant was entitled to assume decedent would stop 
at the stop sign (the circumstances justified the jury in con-
cluding that he was remiss if he made such assumption) and 
that defendant was entitled to the imminent peril rule with 
respect to swerving (whether there was such peril and he acted 
as a man of ordinary prudence was an issue for the jury). 
It is not the rule, as asserted by the majority, that the last 
clear chance rule does not apply where two moving vehicles 
are involved; the conclusion reached is contrary to the authori-
ties in this state. 
We said in Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102, 105, 106 [237 
P.2d 645] : "It was for the jury to determine whether in the 
space of time involved he could have avoided the collision.'' 
In Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35 Cal.2d 16 [215 P.2d 728], 
this court reversed the trial court for refusal to instruct on 
the doctrine where two moving vehicles were involved, dece-
dent on a bicycle and defendant in a car following him and 
the decedent turned to the left in the path of the car. 
In Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977], 
the vehicles were both moving toward an intersection and 
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would arrive there at the same time. The plaintiff was not 
looking at defendant and a collision occurred. This court 
said (p. 113): " ... [T]here is ample evidence from which 
the jury could determine that a reasonably prudent man, 
knowing the facts of which Burkhalter was aware, should 
have foreseen that Peterson might not turn or stop his motor 
scooter. Under smh circumstances, it was negligent for Burk-
halter to proceed toward the intersection acting upon a con-
trary assumption. . . . Considering the evidence in the Pon-
cino case [relied upon by the majority], it does not stand 
for the proposition that, as a matter of law, a defendant 
with two seconds within which to avoid an accident had no 
chance to do so. In a proper case, an appellate court might 
say that the defendant did not have a chance which amounted 
to a 'clear' one. But the rule should not be applied when 
the only evidence is to the effect that the defendant could 
have avoided the accident within the existing time and dis-
tance limitations. 
''Burkhalter saw Peterson when 50 feet from the inter-
section. He estimated that he could stop his automobile within 
10 or 15 feet. He did stop within 28 to 30 feet after the 
impact, and testified that he could have done so sooner. All of 
the evidence indicates that Burkhalter might have halted his 
automobile at a much less distance than 50 feet. 
"Moreover, Burkhalter's testimony reveals that he made 
no attempt to avoid the accident by turning his automobile 
or sounding his horn. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, 
that he did not have sufficient time in which to do something, 
and the jury properly might have found that sounding his 
horn to attract the attention of Peterson would have con-
stituted the exercise of reasonable care on his part to avert 
the accident." (Italics added.) That case is indistinguishable 
from the one at bar. 
In Center v. 1Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 205 [13 P.2d 918], 
plaintiff, a pedestrian, was moving across the street not at a 
crosswalk and defendant was driving on the street when his 
car struck plaintiff. Plaintiff was not observing defendant's 
approach. It was held defendant had a last clear chance to 
avoid the accident by swerving, blowing his horn or stopping. 
In Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197 [13 P.2d 915], 
plaintiff drove across a main highway on a secondary cross-
road looking away from defendant's car approaching the 
intersection on the main highway. Defendant drove his car 
into plaintiff's. This court pointed out that the trial court 
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found that the evidence (p. 200) "established the fact that 
when plaintiff approached and was proceeding across the path 
of the oil truck, and up to the time of the collision, he did 
not see and "'ras totally oblivious of the approach of the truck, 
and the danger that confronted him; that defendant Elam 
first saw plaintiff's car some forty or fifty feet away from the 
intersection; that he saw plaintiff looking lJtraight ahead, in 
an opposite direction, and not slowing the speed of his auto-
mobile; that Elam was traveling at a speed of twenty miles an 
hour and could have stopped his truck almost immediately, 
and 'vi thin a distance of a few feet; that he had ample time 
and sufficient distance, at least twenty-five to thirty-five feet, 
in which to stop and avoid coming in contact with plaintiff's 
car, but failed to do so,'' and concluded that defendant could 
have avoided the collision by stopping, swerving or blowing 
his horn. 
Chappell v. San Diego etc. Ry. Co., 201 Cal. 560 [258 P. 73], 
involved a collision between two moving vehicles at an inter-
section of a street railway and street. The one on the tracks 
was a gas motor railway car and the one on the street an 
automobile. It appeared that defendant (operator of the 
railway car) could have stopped when he first saw the car 
approaching when 55 feet to 60 feet from the crossing. It ap-
peared that plaintiff was approaching slowly and attempting 
to stop. The court said (p. 565): "The verdict must be taken 
as a finding that the defendant's car failed to stop as soon as it 
was possible for it to have done so in the exercise of due care 
and that the last act of negligence of the defendant was the 
proximate cause of the injury. This it was the province of the 
Jury to find under the instructions of the court relating to 
the doctrine of the last clear chance." (Italics added.) 
Podeszwa v. White, 99 Cal.App.2d 777 [222 P.2d 683], while 
not involving the doctrine, is directly in point. Defendant 
approached an intersection at 40 miles per hour on a through 
highway and saw decedent's car approaching a stop sign at 
the intersection at 10 miles per hour and did not stop but 
continued across the highway. The court said (p. 779) : "Mani-
festly by a very slight swerve of his truck he could have 
passed behind the coupe and avoided the accident. Further-
more, when he observed the coupe passing. the boulevard stop 
sign and approaching the Orangethorpe pavement the appli-
cation of his brakes would have slowed his truck sufficiently 
to allow the coupe to pass in front of him. The fact that the 
driver of the coupe did not make the boulevard stop as re-
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quired by law (Veh. Code, §§ 552, 577) did not justify 
defendant in failing to reduce his speed or change the direction 
of his car in an effort to avoid the accident.'' 
The basic principle is that it is for the trier of the fact 
to determine whether defendant had a last clear chance to 
avoid the collision and that is true where the evidence is 
inconclusive or contradictory, or as stated: "It is not improper 
to instruct the jury on the doctrine of 'last clear chance' 
when, on any valid theory, there is substantial evidence to 
support the application of that principle. ( Gardini v. Arake-
lian, 18 Cal.App.2d 424, 430 [ 64 P.2d 181].) In the case 
entitled Wheeler v. Buerkle, H Cal.App.2d 368, 373 [58 P.2d 
230], it was said that 'if the facts of a case do not bring 
the doctrine into play the court must so decide,' and if the 
facts be such that the doctrine rnay be applied, it is the duty 
of a trial judge to submit it to a jury by proper instructions, 
or to find upon it in the absence of a jury." (Wright v. Los 
Angeles Ry. Corp., 14 Cal.2d168, 178 [93 P.2d135].) Here 
there are three theories sustained by the evidence that de-
fendant could have avoided the accident; he could have 
stopped, swerved or sounded his horn. 
In making the statement that the doctrine does not apply 
to two moving vehicles approaching an intersection the ma-
jority cites Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 136 Cal.App. 223 
[28 P.2d 932]. No citation of authority is made for that 
statement in the Poncino case. A hearing in this court was 
denied. As pointed out by this court in Peterson v. Burkhalter, 
supra, 38 Cal.2d 107, that case was based upon the proposi-
tion that plaintiff was aware of the danger rather than that 
defendant did not have an opportunity to avoid it; that was 
the only basis for distinguishing it from Girdner v. Union 
Oil Co., supra, 216. Cal. 197, and otherwise the case was in 
effect overruled as being out of line with the Girdner case. 
Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528 
[129 P.2d 503), cited for the same proposition, cites in addi-
tion to the Poncino case, only cases dealing with railroad 
crossing collisions where the courts have been reluctant to 
apply the doctrine because of a feeling that a railroad com-
pany should not be expected to stop at crossings under any 
circumstances. Certainly that is not true of automobiles ap-
proaching intersections. The same is true of Folger v. Rich-
field Oil Corp., 80 Cal.App.2d 655 [182 P.2d 337], Dalley 
v. Williams, 73 Cal.App.2d 427 [166 P.2d 595], Berton v. 
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Cochran, 81 Cal.App.2d 776 [185 P.2d 349], and Allin v. 
Snavely, 100 Cal.App.2d 411 [224 P.2d 113], which make no 
such statement. Moreover, as above seen, there are numerous 
decisions by this court applying the doctrine to moving 
vehicles. 
There is no reason why it should not apply in such a 
situation considering the speed with which automobiles are 
now operated and the necessity for rapid reaction to avoid 
accidents. Here we have a person (defendant) approaching 
an intersection at 40 miles per hour. He sees another car 
approaching at the same speed on the crossroad and the driver 
of the car (decedent) does not observe him. When the other 
car was at least 50 feet from the stop sign defendant was 
no longer justified in assuming it would stop at the stop sign. 
It is not reasonable to suppose that the driver of the other 
car would at that point apply his brakes with full force and 
come to a shrieking stop. Hence when the other car was at 
that point the defendant had adequate opportunity to stop 
his car or swerve from its path to avert the collision. 
What was said by the District Court of Appeal in Bragg v. 
Smith, 87 Cal.App.2d 11, at page 15 [195 P.2d 546], is 
pertinent here: ''The defendant actually discovered the situa-
tion and realized the danger while it was still possible to 
avoid ~the collision by the use of ordinary care on his part. 
The opportunity was clearly open to him to avoid the accident 
by turning either to his right or to his left. While it may 
be true that he had to act quickly, it is not unusual for a 
motorist to be confronted with such a necessity and it cannot 
be said, as a matter of law, that a distance of approximately 
100 feet was not sufficient to enable him to have a clear chance 
to slightly alter the course of his vehicle. Common experience 
is to the contrary, and the evidence here is sufficient to support 
the court's finding that a last clear chance to avoid the acci-
dent existed after the defendant actually knew that the 
plaintiff was in a position of danger from which he would 
be unable to escape by any action which he could then take. 
(Cady v. Sanford, 57 Cal.App. 218 [207 P. 45] .) " 
It should be remembered that the trial court denied a 
motion on behalf of defendant for a directed verdict and 
submitted the case to the jury under appropriate instructions 
applying the last clear chance doctrine, and the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of plaintiffs from which it must be implied 
that they determined as a fact that defendant had a last 
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clear chance to avoid the collision after perceiving that de-
cedent was in a position of peril. The trial court then granted 
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Plaintiffs took an appeal from the judgment and the District 
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, by unanimous 
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Mussell and concurred in 
by Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard and Mr. Justice Griffin 
reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial 
court with instructions to enter judgment in conformity with 
the verdict of the jury. ( (Cal.App.) 238 P.2d 25.) The 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal contains a correct 
statement of the facts, is well reasoned and is supported by 
abundant authority. The following statement is contained 
in the concluding paragraph of the opinion: "We conclude 
that there was substantial evidence to support the findings 
of the jury and that the trial court erred in rendering a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.'' 
From the foregoing it clearly appears that the trial judge 
was of the opinion that the last clear chance doctrine was 
applicable when he submitted the case to the jury and that 
the jury found the facts necessary to support a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiffs. Although the trial judge changed his 
mind after the verdict was returned, it was the unanimous 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal that the evidence 
warranted the submission of the case to the jury and that 
the question of whether or not the defendant had a last clear 
chance to avoid the collision was one of fact and not of law, 
and reversed the trial court. 
The very recent case of Pfingsten v. W estenhaver, ante, 
p. 12, at page 19 [224 P.2d 395], reannounced the well 
settled rule that "Where different conclusions may reasonably 
be drawn from the evidence by different minds the trial court's 
(jury's) findings are not to be disturbed on appeal." (See, 
also, Connor v. Owen, 28 Cal.App.2d 591, 592-593 [82 P.2d 
1114].) 
I do not believe it can fairly and honestly be said that 
the record in this case presents a factual situation on which 
reasonable minds cannot differ. What has happened thus 
far demonstrates beyond question that reasonable minds have 
arrived at different conclusions on the record before us. Such 
being the case, under the well-settled doctrine, the issue is 
one of fact and not of law, and hence should be determined 
by the trier of fact-the jury in this case. 
304 RODABAUGH V. TEKUS [39 C.2d 
While the majority opinion in this case will create great 
confusion because it is in clear conflict with numerous other 
decisions of this court and the District Courts of .Appeal 
which I have cited hereinabove, of graver and more far-reach-
ing concern is the problem that it is in direct violation of the 
constitutional provision that ''the right of trial by jury shall 
be secured to all, and remain inviolate''; (Cal. Const., art I, 
§ 7). It cannot be doubted that where a factual situation 
is presented in a case in which litigants are entitled to a jury 
trial as a matter of right, and the court takes the case from 
the jury and decides as a matter of law that there is no 
issue of fact to be determined, the litigants have been deprived 
of a jury trial, and the Constitution has been violated. Such 
is the situation in the case at bar. While this result may seem 
to be unimportant in this case, it has an insidious impact 
on our whole constitutional structure. If judges who have 
taken a solemn oath to support the Constitution can ruth-
lessly disregard its provisions, as the majority has done here, 
why demand loyalty oaths from those holding positions of 
lesser importance~ 
I would reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to 
enter judgment on the verdict of the jury . 
.Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied .August 
7, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
